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Abstract
Political scientists use expert surveys to assess latent features of politi-
cal actors. Experts, though, are unlikely to be equally informed and assess
all actors equally well. The literature acknowledges variance in measurement
quality, but pays little attention to the implications of uncertainty for ag-
gregating responses. We discuss the nature of the measurement problem in
expert surveys. We then propose methods to assess the ability of experts to
judge where actors stand and to aggregate expert responses. We examine the
effects of aggregation for a prominent survey in the literature on party politics
and EU integration. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we demonstrate that it
is better to aggregate expert responses using the median or modal response,
rather than the mean.
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1 Introduction
Political scientists rely on expert surveys to measure a wide array of variables —
the positions of parties on policy dimensions (e.g. Benoit and Laver, 2006; Bakker
et al., 2015), the importance of portfolios (Druckman and Warwick, 2005), the ef-
fectiveness of regional trade agreements (Gray and Slapin, 2012), the preferences of
bureaucracies (Clinton and Lewis, 2008) and the quality of elections (Norris, Frank
and Mart´ınez i Coma, 2013). Yet, experts’ ratings are rarely in perfect agreement.
While scholars have explored the variation in expert placements (Hooghe et al., 2010;
Mart´ınez i Coma and Ham, 2015) and have proposed solutions to anchor experts on
the scales (Bakker et al., 2014), we argue that these approaches are insufficient for
understanding the nature of the measurement problem in data derived from expert
assessments.
If a single expert were perfectly knowledgeable, the opinion of that expert may
be sufficient and preferable to multiple opinions of lesser informed ones. But re-
searchers do not know how knowledgeable experts are. The goal of an expert survey
is thus to aggregate the responses from many experts, typically by taking the mean.
We challenge this widely accepted form of response aggregation and demonstrate
that mean expert responses may produce biased estimates of the latent concept
researchers wish to measure. Confusion arises in part, we argue, because politi-
cal scientists have not adequately distinguished between the tasks of inference and
aggregation in expert surveys, leading to insufficient attention paid to problems sur-
rounding aggregation. Taking the mean leads to bias due to scale truncation and
central tendency biases among respondents in low information environments. We
demonstrate the problem using Monte Carlo simulations, data from a prominent
expert survey, and by conducting a replication of a prominent study. We provide
an easy-to-implement solution to this aggregation problem — using the median or
modal expert response, rather than the mean.
2 Example: Expert Surveys on Party Positions
Studies using expert surveys largely rely on mean expert placement, using stan-
dard deviations or standard errors to assess uncertainty. Yet, the shape of expert
placement distributions can vary drastically across the items in a survey. Politi-
cal parties, for example, can have similar estimated mean party positions based on
very different distributions of expert placements.1 Figure 1 shows distributions of
expert responses for selected parties on an EU Integration dimension and a Left-
Right Economic Policy dimension, two commonly used scales from the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2015), a widely used dataset. On the EU
Integration dimension, the mean expert placement suggests that the Dutch VVD, an
economically liberal party, and the Finnish SDP, a center-left party, are moderately
1Other fields take different approaches to similar problems. In medicine, expert panels rate
the severity of disease on scales and use consensus or median expert opinion to reach diagnoses
(Bertens et al., 2013).
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(b) Left-Right Economic Policy
Figure 1: Distribution of expert responses on two common policy dimensions.
Euroskeptic.2 However, whereas experts in the Netherlands strongly disagree about
the position of the VVD, experts in Finland strongly agree on the position of the
SDP.
The Left-Right Economic Policy dimension, which typically shows smaller varia-
tion in expert placements, uncovers similar problems. Figure 1 shows expert place-
ments for Left-Right Economic Policy for the French National Front and the Polish
Civic Platform. The Front National has a bimodal distribution; on average, experts
judge it to be a center-right party. But the contrast to the Polish Civic Platform
— a party with a similar average position — is striking. Experts use almost the
entire scale to place the French party, while experts agree that the Polish party is
center-right. These illustrations underscore that distributions of expert placements
can vary drastically despite having similar means. Moreover, in the example of the
National Front, the mean provides an answer that is likely wrong. Assuming all
experts are equally well-informed, our best guess about the party position ought to
2The EU Integration dimension is problematic as experts tend not to place parties in the middle
of the dimension (Proksch and Lo, 2012).
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be somewhere near 2–3 or 8–10, the regions where most expert assessments lie; it
should not be a value in the middle where the fewest experts locate the party. We
explore this problem more systematically by using a Monte Carlo simulation. We
demonstrate that when experts do not assess positions perfectly, the mean leads to
biased estimates of true positions. Researchers are better off using the median or
modal response.
3 Expert Surveys and Statistical Inference
The statistical inference problem in expert surveys differs substantially from the
frequentist notions of inference researchers typically apply when analyzing public
opinion surveys (see Benoit and Laver, 2006, ch. 4). In public opinion surveys,
researchers wish to measure a population parameter by randomly sampling obser-
vations from that population. In contrast, the primary objective of expert surveys
is not to learn about the experts, who are not chosen at random from a population.
Rather, researchers wish to glean information from experts on a topic on which
they have expertise. Because researchers do not necessarily know how knowledge-
able their experts are, they ask many experts and aggregate their responses, hoping
the aggregate response is closer to the truth. In asking for and aggregating multi-
ple experts’ responses, two problems arise: the first results from experts’ differing
perceptions and the second from the nature of scale truncation.
Formally, assume that an object to be rated has a true, latent position γ on some
continuous scale which researchers ask n experts to assess.3 Typically, researchers
ask these experts to make their assessment on a (Likert) scale with a limited number
of response options. Each expert assessment xi, where i = 1, . . . , n, forms part of
a vector of expert responses X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
′. Let there be an expert-specific
function, gi(·), where i = 1, . . . , n, which maps the true party position γ to the
expert assessments, X. We wish to infer γ from X, and our ability to do so rests on
the nature of gi(·). If expert assessments were continuous, we might assume gi(·) to
be a linear function such that:
xi = gi(γ, α, β, )
= αi + βiγ + i,
(1)
where α is a shift parameter, β is a stretch parameter, and  is noise. If all experts
are perfectly informed and have no biases (αi = 0, βi = 1, i = 0 ∀i), then each
xi = γ. Having one expert is as good as having hundreds. However, if the experts
3Increasing the number of experts does not increase certainty around the measurement of γ.
Benoit and Laver (2006, ch. 4) claim otherwise. They calculate standard errors for party positions
based on the standard deviation of expert placements as well as the number of expert placements.
However, this approach has been almost unanimously rejected by the literature on interrater agree-
ment (e.g., Kozlowski and Hattrup, 1992; LeBreton and Senter, 2008). If experts were drawn at
random from the population of all experts, increasing the number of respondents would shrink the
standard error of the mean expert perception of a party’s position. But being increasingly confi-
dent about the mean expert perception does not imply that experts are actually good at assessing
the latent party position.
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are not all equally informed, uniformly poorly informed, or have different biases in
their perceptions of γ, they will not respond in the same manner.
Existing rescaling techniques account for differences arising from individual re-
spondent biases and perceptions, referred to as differential-item functioning (DIF)
(Aldrich and McKelvey, 1977; Hare et al., 2015). These models estimate the expert-
specific α and β parameters in Equation 1, but they do not account for another
type of bias that arises as the result of rating items. When assessing objects that
lie at the extremes of the scale, the truncated nature of the scale means that ex-
perts can only make mistakes in one direction, namely towards the middle. Experts
with a tendency towards making centrist placements when uninformed (central ten-
dency bias) are doubly susceptible to this bias.4 Even when all experts perceive
the scale identically, if any noise exists, truncation bias must exist as well. Mean
expert ratings will estimate objects located near the extremes as increasingly cen-
trist as random noise increases. And among summary statistics, the mean will be
most affected by random centrist placements resulting from noise. Better and worse
measured objects could even change rank positions when summary statistics more
robust to centrist outlying placements are used for aggregation.
We could reduce truncation bias by using only the responses of better informed
experts, except that we have no good way of identifying them. The best we can
do is to observe the distribution of all expert responses to assess whether poorly
informed experts may exist. Increasing the number of expert responses does not
provide us with greater certainty about γ, but it does allow us to get a better sense
of the shape of the distribution of expert responses. We can then determine the
consequences of aggregation using different summary statistics in the presence of
expert disagreement.
Existing robustness and validity checks applied to expert survey responses in-
sufficiently assess the consequences of aggregation. Most analyses focus on the
mean expert placement, and may, at best, examine disagreement using the stan-
dard deviation of placements (Hooghe et al., 2010). Although recent analyses take
concerns about differing expert scale perceptions into account (Clinton and Lewis,
2008; Bakker et al., 2014), they do not consider truncation bias. In the next section,
we explore these consequences using Monte Carlo simulations.
4 Monte Carlo Simulation
We simulate a data generating process underlying expert assessments of parties
and determine when aggregate measures best capture true positions. Our latent
dimension is continuous on a given interval. We generate 100 true positions by
taking draws from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 10. We refer to this
vector of true positions as γ. In the real world, researchers design the expert survey
and ask experts to make an assessment of the truth on a discrete scale, often ranging
from 0 to 10: y ∈ [0, 1, . . . , 10].
The simulation, which we run 1,000 times, begins with “experts” reporting their
perceptions of the positions on the discretized scale y. In our simulation, we draw
4For an extensive discussion of central tendency bias, see James, Demaree and Wolf (1984).
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expert j’s assessment of party i as follows:
ratingij = αj + βjγi + ij, (2)
with each ratingij rounded to the nearest integer and truncated to lie between 0 and
10. The quantity α is an expert-specific shift parameter and β is an expert-specific
stretch parameter. Following the DIF setup, these parameters allow each expert
to perceive the space differently. The error term means that experts assess some
parties better than others. We run the simulation four times using 5, 10, 15 and 20
experts to examine the effect of consulting more experts. More information on the
simulation parameter values is located in the supplemental appendix.
Having drawn expert assessments, we calculate the mean, median, and mode
response for each party.5 Because we set γ, the true party positions, we can assess
how well the mean, mode and median of the expert assessments recover the truth.
We regress the truth, γ, on each of the summary statistics of the expert responses —
the mean, median or mode — for each of the 1,000 simulated expert datasets. We
expect an estimated regression slope of 1, representing a perfect relationship with
the truth. We assess performance of the summary statistics using OLS to mirror
how expert data are typically used — as an independent variable in a regression
model. Although we examine the relationship between our aggregate measure and
the truth, any bias we find would also be present in the relationship between the
aggregate measure and a dependent variable causally related to the truth.
After setting the true positions, the simulation steps are as follows:
1. Draw n expert assessments for each of the 100 parties using Equa-
tion 2, where n is 5, 10, 15, or 20.
2. Round the expert assessments to the nearest integer and truncate
them, so that all assessments lie between 0 and 10.
3. Aggregate the expert assessments using the mean, median and
mode for each of the 100 parties.
4. Estimate three bivariate regressions of true positions on each of the
aggregate measures and save the slope coefficients.
5. Repeat steps 1–4 1,000 times and generate a boxplot of the 1,000
slope coefficients.
We run a second set of simulations to capture the possibility that some experts
perceive a party in a systematically different manner than other experts. This
second simulation captures one way in which a bimodal pattern such as that seen
for the Front National in Figure 1 may arise. Experts are selected at random (with
probability 0.35) to view a subset of extreme parties (35% of parties with a position
greater than 7.5 or less than 2.5) in mirror image. For example, while most experts
would observe a party with a true position of 8, the randomly selected subset of
experts would view a party with a true position of 2. This simulation is equivalent
5In secondary analysis, we account for uncertainty by using a non-parametric bootstrap of the
expert responses, calculating the aggregation statistic in each of the simulated response datasets,
and then accounting for that measurement error in all models.
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Figure 2: Simulations across different numbers of experts.
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to a case in which experts are asked to rate a populist far right party on a traditional
left-right economic dimension. The majority of experts view the populist economic
policies of a far right party as right-wing policies, but a subset of experts recognise
these policies (likely to include state intervention and subsidies) as matching notions
of left-wing economic interventions. While neither is wrong, we take as the truth
the scale mapping that the majority of experts see.
The results of both sets of simulations are presented in Figure 2. The top row
of Figure 2 presents the results when all experts perceive the scales identically. The
mean is biased and consistently underestimates the truth. Adding more experts
reduces noise in the estimates but it does not reduce the bias. The median recovers
the true relation nearly perfectly regardless of the number of experts asked, and
increasing the number of experts reduces noise. Finally, the mode recovers the truth
most accurately when we use 15 experts. Increasing the number of experts further
reduces noise, but the mode starts to overestimate the truth. In the simulation where
some experts view a mirror image of the truth, presented in the bottom row, the
mean greatly underestimates the truth. The median and mode both perform much
better, although they, too, underestimate the truth. The small subset of experts
who view the truth differently have a greater impact on the mean than the median
or mode.
These simulation results have important implications for the design and inter-
pretation of expert surveys. If there is reason to think that experts may not be fully
knowledgeable, possess varied biases, or perceive scales differently, then researchers
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Figure 3: Party rank order changes resulting from aggregation.
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should recognize that different summary statistics can provide different answers
about the nature and impact of party positions. These simulations suggest that
the median and mode recover the truth better than the mean. At a minimum, the
results suggest that when faced with discrepancies in expert placements, researchers
should check the robustness of their results to different means of aggregation.
The CHES party expert survey further demonstrates that researchers must care-
fully consider their approach to aggregating expert placements. Figure 3 presents
the percentage of countries in each survey wave that experience at least one rank
order shift among the parties as a result of using the mean versus the mode and
the mean versus the median. Depending on survey and dimension, between 20%
and 50% of countries have at least one rank order change in their party system as a
result of using a different aggregation method.
5 Application — Understanding Party Position
Shifts
Response aggregation can affect the results of studies relying on expert placements.
We replicate a study by Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu (2014), which examines
how citizens update their views on parties’ policy position shifts. In doing so, we also
show how a simple bootstrap can help gauge the effects of uncertainty in the expert
data on our inferences. Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu (2014) argue that citizens,
rather than relying on party manifestos to update their information on party policy
position shifts — a view that has had a long tradition in the extant literature —,
draw on a variety of information sources when updating their beliefs. Adams, Ezrow
and Somer-Topcu use expert opinions from the CHES surveys as a proxy for broad
information gathering. Focusing on European integration, their empirical analysis
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Table 1: Citizens’ perceptions of parties’ policy shifts on European integration
(Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu, 2014): Replication and alternative models.
W/O Clustered Clustered Bootstrapped Bootstrapped Mean
Mean Mean Median Mode rwg > 0.7
Party j’s perceived shift 0.263 0.263 0.150 0.107 0.215
using experts (t) (0.092) (0.082) (0.087) (0.071) (0.117)
Party j’s shift −0.192 −0.192 −0.150 −0.155 −0.191
using Euromanifestos (t) (0.170) (0.137) (0.178) (0.179) (0.211)
Intercept 0.138 0.138 0.134 0.135 0.101
(0.069) (0.062) (0.072) (0.073) (0.086)
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.085 0.036
N 78 78 78 78 59
confirms their hypothesis. The finding is an important contribution to the ongoing
debate about political sophistication of citizens.
However, using the mean to aggregate divergent expert opinions when calculat-
ing party policy shifts may impact these results. The study uses one of the better
measured items in the CHES data — party position with respect to European inte-
gration — and focuses on parties in Western Europe, where experts tend to display
higher levels of agreement. Thus, if we find that expert disagreement creates prob-
lems in this case, it is likely to create issues in a large number of other studies,
too.
First, we examine how robust the results are to different aggregation approaches.
We also account for uncertainty in the aggregated expert responses resulting from
disagreement among experts. If we were to simply rely on the median, modal or
mean response, we would be assuming that our point estimate has no associated
noise. To address this issue, we conduct a non-parametric bootstrap of the expert
data. We create 100 bootstrapped expert data sets by sampling with replacement
from the set of expert responses for each party on the European integration di-
mension. From the sampled expert responses, we calculate the modal response to
construct the relevant variable and estimate the Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu
(2014) model 100 times — once in each sample. Finally, we summarize the results
across the 100 samples using model averaging just as one would when imputing
missing data (Blackwell, Honaker and King, 2015).
Table 1 presents the results. The first model replicates the Multivariate Model
(3) in Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu without clustered standard errors. The
second model uses clustered standard errors and therefore is an exact replication
of Multivariate Model (3). Clustering has very little effect on the standard errors.
We therefore proceed to estimate the other models without clustering. Using the
bootstrapped median and mode, the results of Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu
become much weaker (columns 3 and 4). The coefficient on the variable of interest
is only 57% of its former size when using the bootstrapped median and only 41%
of its reported size when using the bootstrapped mode. Neither the median nor
mode variable attains statistical significance. In the final model, we use the mean
9
responses, but estimate the model using only well measured parties.6 The coefficient
estimate using only better measured parties is still smaller than the original estimate
using the mean and all parties, further indicating that poorly measured parties with
high levels of expert disagreement are contributing to the authors’ findings.
Our analysis suggests that the substantive effects presented by Adams, Ezrow
and Somer-Topcu (2014) may not be as strong as they suggest. Their results are at
least partly driven by disagreement in expert placements of parties and the choice
to aggregate these responses using the mean. Nevertheless, we would not go so far
as to say that the Adams, Ezrow and Somer-Topcu (2014) results are incorrect.
We are accounting for measurement error in only one of the two variables. There
is almost certainly measurement error in the variable based on Euromanifestos, as
well, and accounting for that measurement error could impact the coefficient on the
expert survey variable. Our point is simply that disagreement among experts in
rating parties can lead to incorrect inferences about the impact of party positioning
when using party position as an independent variable in regression analyses.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Political scientists make frequent use of expert surveys, but they have not properly
examined the consequences of lack of expert agreement on aggregation of responses.
Our findings have implications for those who wish to collect new expert survey
data and those using existing data. Those running new surveys must consider the
degree to which experts can assess individual items. Within party position surveys
in political science, the locations of some parties and on some dimensions are easier
to assess than others. In the supplementary appendix, we apply common measures
of agreement to the CHES data to underscore the problems of lack of agreement.
It may also be useful to design items in expert surveys aimed at gauging ex-
pert knowledge. Researchers could give more weight to knowledgeable experts and
determine whether disagreement results from heterogenous expert ability or a fun-
damental lack of agreement on where targets lie on the scale. Lastly, it might be
useful to think about other types of survey designs, beyond Likert scales, that may
lessen the cognitive burden placed on experts, resulting in higher levels of agreement
(e.g. pairwise comparisons).
For those using existing data, we suggest that researchers examine expert agree-
ment and reliability within the items they wish to use by drawing on well-known
techniques (Finn, 1970; James, Demaree and Wolf, 1984; van der Eijk, 2001). If
items are poorly measured, it may not be wise to use them in secondary analyses.
And when disagreement among experts exists, researchers should check the robust-
ness of their results to aggregation using the median and modal expert responses.
6We rely on a common measure of agreement, the rwg score (Finn, 1970; James, Demaree and
Wolf, 1984), which examines the dispersion of responses with reference to a null distribution. The
supplementary appendix provides details on how it is calculated and applies it to the CHES data
more broadly. The measure ranges from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (perfect agreement). Scores in
excess of 0.7 are considered indicative of strong agreement.
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